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Introduction
Among the many challenges facing the 
Central Asian states, security is one of the 
most pressing concerns. Yet the way these 
states discuss the issue is significantly 
affected by external actors’ approaches to 
security in the region. Russia and China are 
the two most influential countries in shaping 
the security strategies of the Central Asian 
governments, through bilateral relations 
and multilateral organisations such as 
the CSTO (Collective Security Treaty 
Organisation) and the SCO (Shanghai 
Cooperation Organisation). However, 
this does not mean that Kazakhstan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and 
Uzbekistan are “victims” of Russian and 
Chinese authoritarian pressure, without 
which they would take a more democratic 
approach. Even Russian influence, 
although much stronger in this area than 
China’s, cannot by itself explain the security 
decisions of the Central Asian regimes, 
as these decisions are chiefly driven by 
domestic issues and local political culture.
The European Union, along with Russia, 
China, and obviously the United States, 
is also an external security actor in the 
region. However, its visibility on the security 
issue is low; current EU mechanisms 
are too dispersed to be effective, it has 
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no sufficiently defined goals, and has 
put forward no clear vision of how to 
address long-term security challenges. 
Consequently, there is no European 
“grand narrative” on Central Asian security. 
The EU’s tools seem poorly calibrated for 
dealing with security issues at a time when 
Central Asian governments and societies 
are anxious about ISAF’s withdrawal from 
Afghanistan, and are waiting for concrete 
propositions from international actors. 
The aim of this policy brief is neither to 
criticise the lack of financial support that 
the EU allocates to Central Asia, nor the 
lack of leverage that is obtained through 
European programmes. Central Asia 
is not a priority in European external 
policies. It would be difficult for Europe 
to counter Russia’s and China’s influence 
and change the way that Central Asian 
regimes develop their short-term security 
strategies. But these limitations do not 
dispense with the need for the EU to 
provide a better definition of security, 
especially in light of its growing emphasis 
on human security, and to incorporate this 
into its current review of the EU Strategy 
for Central Asia. To this end, this brief will 
centre on the EU’s contribution to human 
security in Central Asia.
Regime security versus human security
Each Central Asian state faces its own set of security challenges. 
Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan have to contend with a greater number 
of security issues, since both lack economic resources and 
face greater social challenges. Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan 
have more economic resources to offer their population, but 
their isolationist and authoritarian policies do not benefit their 
citizens. Uzbekistan also has a significant dilemma, in that its 
booming population can be either a geopolitical strength or a 
social weakness. Kazakhstan is without doubt the best endowed 
of the five states, but it too is not free of security challenges.
Security is multiform: it can mean military security to protect 
the independent states established in 1991 (preventing invasion 
by a neighbour); the political security of the established ruling 
elites (curbing pressures from external actors, limiting internal 
competition and holding on to power); the non-traditional security 
needed to protect these states from Islamist insurgency, civil 
wars and so-called low intensity conflicts, as well as the cultural 
security of the nation as an imagined ethnic group (averting 
demographic or cultural domination); energy security (ensuring 
economic development); and human security (avoiding state 
failure, water management and food security, threats to literacy 
and health care systems, and large migration flows). 
Central Asian governments define the state not as the abstract 
entity of its aggregated citizens but as the embodiment of the 
current leadership and its strategies of legitimacy. Their real focus 
is to maintain regime security, whereas long-term state security 
can only be assured through human security. The concept of 
“human security”, promoted from 1994 by UN institutions – and 
which has provoked much debate about its pertinence – is 
larger. It includes environmental hazards, pandemics, food and 
energy security, pauperisation, migration, access to education, 
health care and transport, as well as corruption, child labour, 
human trafficking, the violation of basic freedoms and respect 
for human rights. 
Central Asian regimes bear a certain amount of responsibility 
for the development of the human security threats with which 
they are now faced. Examples are multiple. In Turkmenistan 
for instance, Saparmurat Niyazov deliberately de-schooled 
the population in the hope that making people illiterate would 
facilitate the acceptance of a dictatorial regime.1 This policy was 
furthered by severely limiting the opportunities for Turkmens 
to develop international contacts, contributing to the country’s 
isolation. In Uzbekistan, Islam Karimov’s regime has used the 
question of the Ferghana borders, and the supposed need 
to reinforce and securitise them, as a vehicle by which to 
frame political legitimacy, contributing to the delegitimisation 
of its Kyrgyz neighbour as the symbol of democratic chaos.2 
Tashkent’s isolationist policies exacerbate the already dire 
socio-economic situation of the border populations, increasing 
the tension between the Kyrgyz and the Uzbeks in Kyrgyzstan.3 
Also child labour, which is part and parcel of the human security 
concept, is a threat to the well-being of the Uzbek population, 
while the forced labour in the cotton fields is organised by the 
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Uzbek administration itself. In Tajikistan, Emomali Rakhmon’s 
obsession for big hydroelectric power stations has undermined 
international projects that focus on small, localised, community-
based hydroelectric stations, as they do not enable the ruling 
elites to divert the international funds allocated to them as 
easily as do gigantic projects like Rogun. The official treatment 
of Islam is also creating insecurity, particularly in Uzbekistan 
and Tajikistan. The restrictions placed on religious practice, 
theological education and arbitrary imprisonment on the grounds 
of ‘Wahhabism’ pushes hundreds of people into worshipping in 
secret and a politicising of faith.4 
Questions of smuggling, and especially of drug trafficking, 
reveal even more about these contradictory security agendas. 
Criminalised shadow economies prosper in Central Asia, since 
the administrative apparatus that is supposed to combat these 
practices is in fact a part of it, either because senior officials 
initiate them, or due to the corruption of law enforcement 
agencies. This is quite visible in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, but 
also in the better regulated states such as Kazakhstan. There 
are strong indications that in all five Central Asian states, a 
number of state representatives at every administrative level, 
including high-ranking state officials, are directly involved in 
the drug trade. Western analysts generally agree that human 
trafficking, especially prostitution, to the Gulf countries is also 
facilitated by high-placed figures in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan.
Last but not least, the lack of good governance and rule of law 
in Central Asia, resulting from the governments’ refusal to take 
these elements into account in the name of overriding regime 
security, fosters the delegitimisation of the state and its elites, 
especially law enforcement agencies. Corruption and private 
interests accentuate inefficiency in the implementation of state 
policies, with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan heading toward state 
failure. The impact of international aid is drastically reduced 
by the high levels of corruption. The conditions are set for 
the expression of political and social discontent, both in weak 
states like Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, as well as in authoritarian 
countries like Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan. Even in 
Kazakhstan, Nursultan Nazarbayev’s inability to solve the issue 
of his succession creates uncertainty and fuels rivalries within 
the elite, which combined with growing social tensions due to 
the meagre distribution of oil revenues outside the capital, has a 
negative impact on the country’s future. 
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The EU’s approach to 
Central Asia’s security challenges
The EU is aware of the growing security problems. The 2007 
EU Strategy for Central Asia sets out a very consensual defini-
tion of “common threats and challenges” which focuses on bor-
der management, Afghanistan’s proximity and drug trafficking. 
The June 2010 Joint EU Council and Commission Implemen-
tation Report of the EU Strategy for Central Asia recognises 
the deficiencies of the Strategy in terms of security, and calls 
for reinforced efforts in “security broadly speaking”.5 It con-
cludes: “It will be necessary to expand the concept of security 
to include major international and regional challenges such as 
human security, combating drug trafficking and trafficking in 
human beings, precursors, nuclear and radioactive materials, 
uranium tailings, border management, bio-safety, bio-security, 
combating terrorism and preventing radicalisation and extrem-
ism, including via a continued emphasis on poverty alleviation. 
Combating corruption is an important element in countering 
many of these security challenges”.6 
Meanwhile the European Parliament is developing its own po-
sition on the implementation of the EU Strategy. The August 
2011 draft report on this matter emphasises the terminology of 
human security, and “takes the view that the cornerstones of 
the EU’s new approach to the region must be human security 
and genuine regional cooperation”.7 In this way it contributes 
to defining the EU’s security approach to the region as well 
as starting a broader debate on the EU’s role in security mat-
ters beyond its neighbourhood. The EU and its member states 
can play a positive role in addressing security issues in Central 
Asia, especially when it comes to human security, through di-
plomacy and development assistance. 
However, the EU lacks clear goals in terms of “security broadly 
speaking”: how can the expression “broadly speaking” be trans-
lated into concrete and effective programmes backed by limited 
financial capacity? Published documents do not give enough 
explanation about which elements of the security paradigm the 
EU intends to work on, and how it will reconcile the diverging 
focuses of the various European actors (Council, Commission, 
Parliament but also through the OSCE and NATO). The EU has 
also not discussed the way it intends to manage the contradic-
tory interests of regime security and human security, nor how it 
aims to obtain meaningful benefits from the dialogue with Cen-
tral Asian governments.
Basically, all the EU programmes and those managed by in-
dividual member states are geared toward “security broadly 
speaking”. The main member states involved in Central Asia 
(the UK, Germany, France, Italy, Austria, the Netherlands and 
Finland) have bilateral or regional assistance programmes fo-
cused on improving education, health care, food security, ac-
cess to water, alleviating poverty, environmental concerns, and 
so on. At the EU level, the Rule of Law Initiative and Human 
Rights Dialogues are up and running while the BOMCA (Border 
Management in Central Asia) and CADAP (Central Asia Drug 
Action Programme) are funded by the EU but largely imple-
mented by the UNDP. However, all these activities are not or-
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ganised into a broad European vision for security support. They 
could achieve greater visibility and effectiveness by being bet-
ter coordinated and presented as part of a larger plan. 
Assessments of the effectiveness of these programmes are of-
ten left unanswered due to a lack of independent audits. BOM-
CA for instance focuses only on the main consensual definition 
of security, the border one, shared by both the EU and the Cen-
tral Asian governments, but improving technical and logistical 
control at the border will have little impact if the issue of cor-
ruption among border guards is not addressed. Some experts 
even suggest that these programmes for combatting corrup-
tion, drug trafficking or illegal cross-border activities actually aid 
those Central Asian senior officials who are involved in traffick-
ing. They supposedly help them eliminate their competitors by 
supplying them with logistics, methods and equipment, as well 
as by providing them with legitimacy. An effective fight against 
drug-trafficking requires real coordination between measures 
that target the producing (giving work to Afghan peasant farm-
ers other than cultivating opium), transit (Central Asia) and 
consuming countries (Russia and Europe). Even where there 
is strong political will the difficulties involved in eliminating the 
administrative connections that drug traffickers have at their 
disposal remain considerable. The feeble commitment of the 
Central Asian governments, who are essentially acting under 
international pressure, cannot be considered a guarantee of 
success. Here again, it would be desirable for the European 
texts to overtly address these sensitive issues.
To protect the private interests of the ruling elites the Central 
Asian regimes tend to hide behind concepts of national secu-
rity. This challenges the notion of comprehensive security, as 
this requires transparency in the way law enforcement agen-
cies work; genuine accountability, or at least better oversight by 
the legislature and civil society of the decisions taken by state 
organs in the name of security; and an attempt to combat cor-
ruption at the highest levels. The Central Asian governments’ 
refusal to address security sector reform (SSR), for instance, 
as proposed by the OSCE, reveals their lack of political will 
in regard to such questions.8 Even Kazakhstan, otherwise the 
most forward-looking on these issues, has blocked fundamen-
tal reforms of the security sector, despite being well aware of 
the fact that corruption erodes good governance and delegiti-
mises the state in the eyes of its citizens.
The EU texts carefully avoid mentioning these difficulties, even 
though EU activities in the region are impeded by them. Instead 
the EU tends to congratulate itself on the institutionalisation of 
the exchanges and meetings, without taking into account the 
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existing disparities with the Central Asian leadership over their 
conception of security or their lack of political will. The EU’s role 
in security matters, in terms of narrative and action, is therefore 
weakly calibrated and poorly assessed.
Why the human security concept can help the 
EU in addressing Central Asian challenges
First, “security broadly speaking” will continue to be in the 
minds of the international community as well as Central Asian 
governments. It can be presumed that with the expected, at 
least partial, ISAF withdrawal from Afghanistan and the still 
unknown evolution of the U.S. presence in the region over 
the next decade, the security environment will be drastically 
reshaped. The EU cannot be absent from this process. It 
has to coordinate and streamline its numerous financial and 
humanitarian commitments, as well as those of its member 
states, by advancing its own structured security narrative. 
This can constitute its ‘branding’ on the Central Asian scene 
vis-à-vis the other influential actors – Russia, China and the 
U.S. The most appropriate narrative for an international actor 
with normative values that refuses hard security and instead 
positions itself in terms of soft power is indeed that of human 
security.
Second, human security is a way to engage in a dialogue with 
Central Asian governments that are often reluctant to discuss 
democracy or human rights. Instead, they focus on regime 
security and use threats to stability as an argument to protect 
the established elites, whereas the EU’s chief interests lie in 
concentrating on state security with a strong link to human 
security. The difference in interests is therefore considerable 
and should not be ignored. Nevertheless, the EU can make 
itself heard, including in the long term, by demonstrating to the 
Central Asian governments that weak governance and endemic 
corruption, i.e. human security issues, provide breeding grounds 
for their main concerns, such as terrorism, and drastically limit 
state effectiveness.
The EU can show through its programmes how human security 
is connected to state security. For instance, the EU Initiative on 
the Rule of Law is a good example of how to address security 
issues in a values-based approach, but it remains too limited in 
its ambition and financial backing. The EU needs to increasingly 
condition its assistance to good governance, human rights and 
security issues. Border management is also a positive step, but 
it is insufficient if not linked to good governance, anti-corruption, 
and drastic reforms of the security services and state organs. 
Support for security sector reform and governance should 
therefore be part, wherever possible, of the EU’s broader human 
security approach.
Third, human security should obviously be part of the moral 
objective of EU external policy, which seeks to defend the idea of 
a peaceful environment achieved through social and economic 
development rather than through hard, military security. More 
pragmatically, this approach offers the EU the only way to have a 
visible impact on security in this region given the strength of the 
other major security actors, especially Russia and China. This 
requires a better articulation of the connection between security 
and development. Social issues such as poverty, food and 
energy security, deteriorating access to health and education, 
alleviating the social impact of expected climate changes, and 
preparedness for natural catastrophes, are the real long-term 
issues for Central Asian societies. Meeting the practical day-
to-day needs of the population should be one of the guiding 
principles of human security policy in Central Asia.
Conclusion
Over the last five years, the EU and European member states 
have attempted to contribute to many aspects of human 
security in Central Asia. However, their actions have lacked 
coordination, their conceptual tools have been poorly adapted, 
and above all they have been missing a grand narrative to 
explain why Europe does not limit its definition of security to 
counter-terrorism. Indeed, the EU views the well-being of 
citizens, social development and the rule of law as vital factors 
in long-term security. Now is the time to bring all these efforts 
together more clearly in a human security strategy, with a focus 
on development, the struggle against corruption and security 
sector reform, and governance.
The concept of human security can provide the EU with a 
conceptual framework that would highlight its geopolitical 
legitimacy in terms of the Russian, Chinese and American 
narratives on security. It would also increase its visibility 
to the Central Asian public. This security rethinking will not 
fundamentally change the region’s status quo. However, it will 
improve aid effectiveness; provide better cohesion between 
the different EU foreign policy goals; and most importantly, aid 
new Central Asian generations in thinking differently about their 
security challenges. It will therefore participate, even if only 
modestly, in the construction of a more stable future in Central 
Asia. In this sense the inclusion and practical use of the concept 
of human security in the current review of the EU Strategy would 
be welcome.
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